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1) This argument is used by Kettunen (1994) is his job competition model.
2) This is corroborated by the fact that  particularly  in the lower segment of the labour market over-schooling
occurs to a large extent. For the Netherlands this is documented in Goort and Maasen-Van den Brink
(1996) and Oosterbeek and Webbink (1996).
3) The implied crowding out effect — or as Dreze and Malinvaud (1993) put it ‘trickling down effect’ — is
not found for the Netherlands by Van Ours and Ridder (1995). However, their results are criticised by both
Van der Laan (1996) and De Beer (1996), who do find crowding out effects.
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1 Introduction
One of the most pressing problems of today is the uneven distribution of the burden of
unemployment across different skill groups. Especially low-skilled workers are more often
unemployed than other skills (OECD, 1994). They are also unemployed for longer periods of
time  (Muysken and Ter Weel, 1997). The unevenness of this distribution seems to indicate that
having different skills determines to some extent one's employment/unemployment opportunities.
However, policy prescriptions meant to alleviate the problems associated with the uneven
distribution of unemployment are primarily based on (conceptual) models which effectively
ignore skill-differences between workers. Policy recommendations involving wage-flexibility
or reductions in costs of hiring and firing, for example, seem to be based on the notion that
essentially skills are not the distinctive elements in defining the employment opportunities of an
individual. Instead, individual skill-services being over-priced or being too costly to hire and/or
fire, are often regarded to be the real cause of disparities in unemployment rates by skill. In this
paper we will argue that this neglects the fact that people with high-level skills have intrinsically
more employment opportunities than people with low-level skills. This is because low-skilled
people may find it (too) hard to fill high-level jobs.  High-skilled people on the other hand may1
be expected to be able to perform, in principle at least, in both low-level jobs and high-level jobs.
In addition, it may well be possible that high-skilled workers are more efficient than low-skilled
workers on low-level jobs. Given these asymmetries between low-skilled and high-skilled
workers’ employment opportunities, it follows directly that the number of low-level jobs is an
upper limit to low-skilled employment, while the number of high-skilled jobs is a lower limit to
high-skilled employment.  Hence, in the absence of supply bottle-necks, high-skilled employment2
can not fall below the number of high-level jobs, whereas low-skilled employment may even fall
to zero, when high-skilled workers take over low-level jobs.  While, therefore, the creation of3
a high-level job necessarily favours high-skilled employment, employment prospects of the low-
skilled are not necessarily improved by the creation of low-level jobs. The creation of high-level
jobs draws high-skilled workers into those jobs, possibly leaving low-level job vacancies in the
process. This gives low-skilled workers the opportunity to fill these vacancies. Thus, by
‘sweeping the employment chimney’ (i.e. the creation of high-level jobs), unemployed low-
skilled workers may simultaneously be drawn into the ‘employment fire’ at the low-skilled end
of the chimney. In the Netherlands, this is knwon as the ‘chimney effect’. By contrast, an increase
in the amount of fuel present at the low end of the chimney through the creation of low-level jobs
(this is the trickling down effect  mentioned in note 3), may actually result in more smoke rather
than a bigger fire. The latter depends to a large extent on the general condition of the employment
chimney itself, as we intend to illustrate in this paper.
An additional asymmetry between different skill types of labour lies in the possibility that low-
4) Gelderblom cs. (1997) observe that education may be related to the opportunity to find a job, which in turn
may lead to crowding out of low-skilled persons.
5) Note, however, that differences in relative efficiencies of different skills in a certain job, may actually lead
to net changes in unemployment measured in man-years, while employment measured in efficiency units
could remain the same. We will come back to this later. 
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skilled workers may be low-skilled because it is difficult for them to learn enough to become
high-skilled. With firms having become 'leaner and meaner' over the last decade, this 'learning-
inability' may provide incentives for entrepreneurs to hire workers who are flexible in the sense
that they could easily learn different types of tasks, instead of hiring people who can only perform
a limited number of tasks. These learning asymmetries between low-skilled and high-skilled
workers may also be part of the explanation of the uneven distribution of unemployment across
skills.4
The above suggests that there are a number of ways to increase the employment prospects of
low-skilled workers. The first one is by increasing the number of low-level jobs, the second by
decreasing the relative labour costs of low-skilled workers thus increasing the willingness of
entrepreneurs to allocate low-skilled workers instead of high-skilled workers to low-level jobs,
and the third by increasing the number of jobs which only high-skilled workers can take. A fourth
option would be to uplift the skill-level of low-skilled workers to some extent by means of (re-)
training programmes. The effectiveness of the first possibility depends in part on the availability
of high-skilled workers for low-level jobs. The effectiveness of the second measure is limited to
the extent that such a change in relative wage costs at first tends to increase the unemployment
of high-skilled workers while decreasing the unemployment of low-skilled workers. However,
when wage-costs per unit of output would fall, a net expansion of jobs may be expected to occur
and therefore a positive net effect on overall employment. Otherwise the bias in unemployment
will just shift against high-skilled workers.  The third measure structurally decreases the5
availability of high-skilled workers for low-level jobs, and hence increases employment prospects
for the low-skilled, almost as a beneficial side-effect. The fourth measure, in as far as it would
be feasible, would be highly desirable, for it would structurally diminish the constraints put on
employment opportunities by the existence of substitution asymmetries between skills.
In this paper we will describe a model which combines most of the notions regarding
asymmetries in employment perspectives between low-skilled workers and high-skilled workers
mentioned above. We will look at the influence of asymmetries in substitution possibilities
between skills, but also of asymmetries in learning capabilities between skills. To this end we
specify a model of labour demand defined in terms of jobs, which, given the supply of labour
which is heterogeneous in the skill-dimension, requires matches to be made between the skills
supplied and the jobs under consideration. The model is highly neo-classical in nature except for
the asymmetries mentioned above. The skill allocation model to be described in this paper is part
of a more general  production structure which has an explicit vintage production structure (see
MASTER (1997) for more details). In this paper, however, we focus exclusively on the skill
allocation model and the way in which it allows the chimney effect to do its work.
The set-up of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we describe the principle outlines of the skill
allocation model called SAM. It summarises the more detailed model description present in
6) Many writers have investigated the possibility of direct substitution between skill-categories. A survey for
the US is provided by Hamermesh and Grant (1979), while Hebbink (1990) and Broer and Jansen (1989)
provide some results for the Netherlands. Kugler c.s. (1990) do the same for Germany. Mincer (1989)
provides additional results for the US. The general conclusions which emerge from these studies are first
that capital and high-skilled labour are complements, while secondly low-skilled labour and the
capital/high-skilled labour complex are substitutes.
7) These are the ‘standard’ substitution assumptions in neo-classical production theory. We also assume that
the implied ‘job aggregator function’ or ‘job substitution function’ obeys the usual restrictions on the signs
of the first and second partial derivatives.
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MASTER (1997). Section 3 describes the results we have obtained with a first empirical
implementation of the skill allocation model for Germany and the Netherlands. Section 4
describes the outcomes of two ex post simulation experiments conducted for those countries.
These experiments were performed in order to highlight the differences between the working of
the chimney effect and standard policy methods to favour employment prospects of  low-skilled
workers. Section 5 contains a summary and some concluding remarks.
2 A Model of Substitution Asymmetries between Jobs and Skills
Introduction
High-skilled people may in general be expected to perform better in low-level jobs than low-
skilled  people in high-level jobs. Hence  there is  an intrinsic  bias against allocating low-skilled
people to high-level jobs. Nonetheless, some kind of substitution between higher skills and lower
skills should be possible (in principle at least), since there is empirical evidence to this effect.6
Our approach differs from the foregoing approaches in that we distinguish between substitution
possibilities between jobs as well as between skills, because these are intrinsically different. In
our set-up, a job is a set of tasks which need to be performed. This  requires  the people engaged
in that job to have a certain minimum skill-level in order to be able to perform the tasks in
question. These specific minimum skill requirements define the level of the job. Therefore,
generally speaking, high-skilled people can be hired for more  job-levels than low-skilled  people.
This provides an asymmetry in employment opportunities for high-skilled and low-skilled
people, which, given a certain lack of compensating asymmetries in wage formation,  leads to
a bias in employment opportunities in favour of high-skilled people.
Ex Ante Job Demand and Ex Post Skill Demand
We assume that the design of a production process entails the definition of certain packages of
tasks for low- and high-skilled people. We assume furthermore that technical constraints on
combining these tasks are such that a decrease of the number of high-level jobs must be
compensated by an increase in the number of low-level jobs and vice versa.  But, once a job-7
combination has been chosen and implemented in the design of machinery and equipment, it can
not be altered : the job-composition of employment is assumed to be ‘putty’ ex ante and ‘clay’
ex post. We also assume that the capital stock depreciates with rate , and so does the number
of jobs embodied in the capital stock. We furthermore assume that the efficiency of a high-skilled
worker on a low-level job relative to the efficiency of a low-skilled worker on that job is given
by the constant number e’. This implies that e’ low-skilled workers on a low-level job could be
Lt
L

#e 	t 	 e ' # (Ht	H  #e 	t)
8) We are referring here to substitution possibilities between low-skilled and high-skilled workers on low-
level jobs only, since, by assumption, high-level jobs can only be taken by high-skilled workers.
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(2.1)
Figure 1  Ex-ante job substitution and ex-post skill substitution
replaced by one high-skilled worker : we assume therefore that the actual allocation of skills to
jobs is essentially ‘putty’ ex post.   The corresponding substitution possibilities between high-8
and low-skilled workers on a low-level  job are given by equation (2.1), which combines the
substitution and relative efficiency assumptions mentioned above:
The framework sketched above can be pictured as in Figure 1. In this figure, H* and L* denote
high-level and low-level jobs, respectively, while H and L denote high- and low-skilled workers,
respectively. Ex ante job-combinations (H*,L*) are described using a standard ‘unit job-iso-
quant’, while the feasible ex post combinations of high- and low-skilled workers associated with
a certain job-combination are given by linear relations in the L,H quadrant as described by (2.1).
In Figure 1, job combinations (L*,H*) are  given in the Nort-East quadrant. The 45-degree lines
in the North-West and South-East quadrants are used to obtain the skill-substitution possibilities
between L and H for any given job-combination (L*,H*) as depicted in the South-West quadrant.
Note that in the latter quadrant, the lines through the points A’,B’ and the points A”,B” are
parallel lines. The angle of these lines with respect to the horizontal is equal to -1/e’ (see equation
(2.1)). The ex-ante choice on the job-combination determines the minimum and maximum
T
P

0
w
e
H , t #Ht  w
e
L , t #Lt #e
	r # t dt
Min Ft 
 P

0
w
e
H , t #Ht  w
e
L,t #Lt #e
	r#t
s.t. Lt 
 L
e 	#t 	 e' # (Ht	H e 	#t )
(L
L e 	 # t, H
H e 	 # t)
wˆ
wˆH	wˆL
wˆH wˆL
wˆ<0 wˆ>0 wˆ<0
9) The influence of  is already accounted for in the definition of L and H in terms of L* and H* (see
equation (2.1)).
10) From now on we drop time-subscripts, unless this would lead to confusion.
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(2.2)
(2.3)
employment opportunities for both low- and high-skilled workers. For instance, in the case of
the job-combination (L*’,H*’), low-skilled employment is bounded between Lmin and Lmax
whereas high-skilled employment is bounded between Hmin and Hmax. Note furthermore from
this figure, that the line A”B” represents smaller employment opportunities for low-skilled
workers than the line A’B’ due to the fact that the number of low-level jobs in job-combination
(L*”,H*”) is much smaller than in job-combination (L*’,H*’). Note, that the intercepts B’ and
B” represent the maximum number of high-skilled workers associated with a certain job-
combination, i.e. B’ and B” are the number of high-skilled workers fully occupying both low-
level and high-level jobs. From now on we define this maximum number of high-skilled workers
to be H’. Finally, it should be noted that the choice of  a certain  point in the L*,H*-quadrant,
defines a feasible choice-set in the L,H-quadrant as given by (2.1). 
Assuming that entrepreneurs can determine the job-layout of their production process (i.e.
(H*,L*)) only when new capacity is installed, it follows that the expected present value of the
operating cost of one labour-efficiency unit installed at time zero declines over time with the
discount rate r and with the rate of technical depreciation .  Hence, the expected present value9
of total operating cost of one labour-efficiency unit which is installed at time zero is given by:
where w  and w  are the expected values of the wage rate for high-skilled and for low-skillede eH,t L,t
workers at time t.
The Allocation of Skills in the Absence of Skill Supply Constraints and Adjustment Costs
In the absence of supply constraints and adjustment costs,  and given a job-combination (L*,H*),
the choices of L  and H  can be modelled by solving:t t
Given the linear nature of the problem, (H=H',L=0) is the solution to (2.3) when w / w <e',e eH L
while  is the solution when the opposite is the case.  Using the10
shorthand notation w=w / w  and , for given and constant expected exponentiale eH L
growth rates  and , there are now four distinct possibilities to consider, depending on
whether w < e' or w > e' and  or . For instance, when w < e' and (case 1) the
wt 

wH , t 
wL , t 


wH,0
wL,0
#e
(wˆH	wˆL) # t 

 e ' 
> t  

ln e' /
wH ,0
wL ,0
wˆH	wˆL
wˆ>0
wˆ<0
wˆ>0
11) Although this has not been indicated in Figure 2, t* can of course be different for cases 2 and 3.
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Figure 2 Expected Wage Growth and Skill-Switching
(2.4)
optimal solution will always be (H=H',L=0). But when w < e' and  (case 2) there will be a
moment when the other solution (H=H*,L=L*) will be chosen. A switch between states will also
occur in case 3, which starts out with w > e' and . Case 4 will always have (H=H*,L=L*)
since w > e' and . The four cases are depicted in Figure 2.
In cases 2 and 3 a switch from the one corner solution of (2.3) to the other will take place at time
t*.   t* itself is easily determined from the condition that at the moment of switching:11
Using equation (2.4), the solution of the original problem over an infinite horizon can be defined
as the solution to the problem of minimizing unit operating costs over two consecutive horizons,
namely 0-t* and t*-. Thus, the minimum expected present value of operating costs of a low-
level job can be obtained directly for all four cases.
T1 
 P

0
wH ,0 #H' #e
(wˆH	' ) # tdt 
 	
wH ,0
wˆH	’
# (L /e'H ) 
 1 #H 1
01
0H k
/ 01
0L k


k
k
1
Ti
i #H

i #L

k /k
12) For a detailed description, see MASTER (1997).
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(2.5)
(2.6)
Choosing Jobs
The solution to the allocation problem defined by the minimisation of (2.3) subject to (2.1), is
easily obtained by substituting (2.1) and (2.4) into (2.3). The solution of the objective function
for case 1 can now be written as:
where   and  are implicitly defined by (2.5), and T  denotes the value of the objective1 1
function given by (2.3) for case 1 as depicted in Figure 2. The term ’ is equal to the rate of
technical decay plus the discount rate. Note that  ,    > 0. Note also that the objective function1 1
T1 is linear in L* and H*. Hence, maximisation of T1 by choosing (L*,H*) constrained by the
unit job-isoquant implicitly defined by 1 (L*,H*)=1, provides values for L*, and H* in terms of
e', relative wages, relative growth rates in wages and the parameters of the job-substitution
function 1 (L*,H*). As was the case with T , T -T  can also be written as  .1 2 4 12
The  ’s and ’s can readily be interpreted as the expected present value of the minimum cost
of operating high- and low-level jobs conditional on expectations with regard to the growth of
relative wages. The solution to the job-composition problem is therefore implicitly given by the
standard first order condition for a cost-minimisation problem:
where L*  and H*  reflect the optimum values of L* and H* when case k (for k=1-4 as depictedk k
in Figure 2) is expected to hold. Note that (2.6) is totally comparable with the first order
conditions of a static cost-minimisation problem, and hence we can conclude that a fall in the
ratio  corresponds to a rise in the relative expected present value of the operating cost of
a low-level job. This in turn leads to a decrease in the slope of the iso-cost lines and hence to a
movement down the unit job isoquant (see Figure 1) and therefore to a decrease in the L*/H*
ratio. 
The optimum choice of a job-combination as described above, can easily be understood by
‘folding’ Figure 1 along the 45-degree line in the North-WEest and South-East quadrants,  so that
the job-dimension and the skill-dimension in Figure 1 would come to overlap completely.  The
result of this ‘folding’ is depicted in Figure 3.
-8-
Figure 3 Ex Ante Job Choices
In this figure the points A’,A”,B’ and B” correspond with the same points in Figure 1. The lines
through A’B’ and through A”B” now both have slope -e’, however. The vertical and horizontal
axes measure two dimensions at the same time. Points on the straight lines with slope -e’ are
points in the L,H dimension, while job-combinations on the unit job-isoquant through points
A’,A,A” are actually points in the L*,H* dimension. Point A on the unit job-isoquant has slope
-e’ by construction.
It is fairly easy to show from the parameterisation of the / ratios (see MASTER (1997)) that
case 1 will have the lowest value of the L*/H* ratio, while case 3 will have a larger L*/H* ratio
than case 4. Case 2 in turn will have a larger L*/H* ratio than case 1, that is: (L*/H*)  > (L*/H*)3 4
> (L*/H*)  = e' and (L*/H*)  > (L*/H*)  = e'.  Case 1 is especially interesting, since the1 2 1
corresponding L*/H* ratio depends on e' only. This is caused by the fact that e' provides a  limit
to the marginal rate of substitution of high-level jobs for low-level jobs which is determined by
economic considerations. Indeed, it does not pay to let the marginal rate of job-substitution along
the unit job-isoquant fall below e', because the corresponding solution to the cost-minimisation
problem (L=0,H=H') would in that case result in an increase in the operating cost of a low-level
job. This follows immediately from Figure 3, where a job-combination to the right of point A on
the unit job-isoquant obviously generates a corresponding point on the horizontal axis to the right
of point B. Because in this case the solution to the cost-minimisation problem would be
(L=0,H=H’), it follows that any point on the horizontal to the right of B represents higher total
expected wage-costs than point B itself. Hence, from a cost-minimisation point of view, any
point to the right of B is inferior to B itself. The same conclusion obviously applies to points on
the unit job-isoquant to the right of point A. For a more detailed discussion of  these results, see
MASTER (1997). 
t 

ln e '
w0
# 1(’	wˆL) #!L ,L 
wˆ
wˆ>0
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(2.7)
The Allocation of Skills and Learning Asymmetries
We now assume that the allocation of a specific skill to a job gives rise to adjustment costs,
which we link to learning cost. When a person is allocated to a job, we assume that he needs to
spend some time learning all the tricks in the trade. The time spent is a given fraction of ‘normal
working hours’ for a person of a similar skill-level already trained for the job. We assume
furthermore that a trainee doesn’t produce anything while learning. Nonetheless the trainee gets
paid for his time. This implies that the learning cost per person is proportional to the wage rate
which applies to the skill-level of the person in question. The corresponding factor of proportion
depends both on the skill-level of the person in question and the type of job this person is trained
for. In addition to this, we assume that each time a job is filled, training costs will have to be
incurred. Obviously, people who have been trained already for a certain job do not have to be
trained again as long as they remain allocated to the job they have been trained for. Consequently,
the experience they have in a certain job brings about an additional asymmetry in the costs of
operating a job by either experienced workers or inexperienced workers of the same skill type.
Let the training cost  of an allocation of skill i to jobtype j, as a fraction of the relevant wage rate
w , be represented by the symbol ! . Furthermore, let us consider the case where . Then,i i,j
eventually the allocation (L->L*) will be the cost-minimising allocation, because the relative
wage rate of high-skilled workers will become infinitely high, while the relative efficiency e' of
high-skilled workers vis a vis low-skilled workers in low-level jobs will remain the same. The
question arises whether low-skilled workers (L) should be allocated to a low-level job (L*) from
the outset, or high-skilled workers (H) should be allocated to that low-level job first. As in the
no-adjustment case, we assume that this depends on the present value of operating the job over
an infinite period of time for given expectations of the growth rate of relative wages and for
given values of the learning cost parameters.
For experienced workers initial matching costs can be disregarded. However, for a switch in the
future, we assume that entrepreneurs will always expect to use inexperienced workers, in order
to be on the ‘safe side’. Hence, the present value of the cost of ‘manning’ and operating a low-
level job by starting with the allocation (H->L*) first and then switching to the final allocation
(L->L*) at time t* can be written as a function of  t* and the various expected present values of
the wage costs associated with the different skills to be allocated to the low-level job.  As we
show in MASTER (1997), this relation can be used to obtain the optimum switching time t* for
an allocation sequence which starts out with the allocation (H->L*) and which ends with the
allocation (L->L*)  by minimisation of the expected costs w.r.t. t*, giving :
t* depends positively on the (effective) rate of discount ’ (which includes the rate of technical
wˆ>0

 (’	wˆL) #!L ,L
0t 
0wˆL
> 0
w0 < e ' # (1(’	wˆL) #!L ,L )
wˆ > 0
w0 > e ' # (1(’	wˆL) #!L ,L )
wˆ < 0
13)  In van Zon and Muysken (1996), switching costs are introduced by means of the notion of a switching
threshold . I.e. entrepreneurs switch from (H->L*) to (L->L*) only when w > e’(1+)  and .
Note that  can directly be interpreted in terms of matching costs, since the switching threshold approach
and the matching costs approach taken here are equivalent when .
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decay).  A rise in either of the parameters would decrease the relative importance of future costs13
in the present value of total cost per low-level job. Hence, the incentive to switch would
diminish, thus increasing t*, ceteris paribus. Likewise, a rise in the adjustment cost of the final
allocation (L->L*) would tend to postpone the moment of switching, i.e. increase  t*, while a rise
in the rate of growth of the wage rate of the skill used in the final allocation, would tend to
increase the unit cost associated with that allocation, and hence the moment of switching may
again be expected to be postponed. This is in line with the fact that , for t* > 0. Note
that the introduction of switching costs postpones the moment of switching (c.f. equation (2.4)).
From equation (2.7) it is clear that t* is positive, only when , since
by assumption. If t* is positive, then an entrepreneur who had started out with the
allocation (H->L*) would be happy to stick with that allocation upto time t*. If
, t* would be negative, and the optimum moment of switching from
(H->L*) to (L->L*) would lie in the past, implying that under the circumstances it would have
been wise to choose the final allocation (L->L*) from the outset. But even if  t*>0, it may be wise
to start with the allocation (L->L*) rather than the allocation (H->L*), for minimisation of the
expected present value of operating costs with respect to t* really assumes that learning costs
associated with the allocation (H->L*) have already been sunk. This would obviously be true in
the case of experienced workers, but false in case of inexperienced workers. In order to resolve
this issue, a direct comparison must be made between the expected operating costs associated
with both feasible allocation sequences (L->L*,L->L*) and (H->L*,L->L*).
The analysis above can be repeated for the case where , which implies that ultimately
the allocation (H->L*) instead of (L->L*) will be the least costly one. The analysis is completely
analogous to the one above, and it is therefore not repeated here.
 
Linear Programming and the 'Chimney Effect'
In order for the chimney effect to work, it is necessary to introduce supply constraints which take
account of asymmetries in substitution possibillities between high- and low-skilled workers. In
those circumstances, an increase in the number of high-level jobs would require an increase in
the employment of high-skilled workers on those jobs. The inflow of high-skilled workers into
those high-level jobs would in part have to be met by an outflow of high-skilled workers from
low-level jobs. The employment-holes this outflow would leave in low-level jobs, creates the
14)  Note that the term mismatch used here, usually refers to the a priori notion that the best match is the one
where the skill-level is exactly equal to the job-level. From a (learning) cost-minimisation point of view,
this is not necessarily the case, because of the possibility of ‘skill-switching’. In this context therefore, a
mismatch refers to a non cost-minimising allocation of skills to jobs, which is due to the existence of
supply constraints.
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employment-opportunities on which the low-skilled workers ultimately depend. In order to add
supply constraints to the existing labour demand framework, we can use the technique of Linear
Programming, as we have done before in van Zon and Muysken (1992). In this way, we are able
to account explicitly for both job-demand constraints and skill-supply constraints. 
Definition of the Linear Programming Problem
The demand side described so far ignores supply constraints. Consequently, the allocation of
skills to jobs referred to first best allocations only. But explicit supply constraints which become
binding may force entrepreneurs to use second best allocations instead. In order to be able to
cover both first-best and second-best allocations, we assume that entrepreneurs solve a linear
programming problem in which they try to meet job requirements as well as skill supply
constraints, while minimising the mismatch  between skill-levels and job-levels on low-level14
jobs.
The definition of the linear programming problem is now quite straightforward. Let E  denoteij,k
the employment of skill j with experience type i on job k. The index i has two values :
experienced and inexperienced with respect to the match in question. The distinction between
experienced and inexperienced workers is important because of the fact that the allocation of an
inexperienced worker with a certain skill level implies having to bear the training/matching costs
associated with that particular combination of skills and jobs, while this is not the case with
experienced workers. Consequently, it is important to distinguish between experienced and
inexperienced workers at the supply side too. In this respect we simply assume that the
experienced workers available for allocation in the present period are those which were allocated
to the job under consideration in the previous period, adjusted for a constant exit-rate. Supply
from other sources (like the educational system or the unemployment pool), which is available
for employment is inexperienced by assumption.
Given these supply constraints, we can now force the solution of the linear programming problem
to be as close as possible to the first-best allocation sequence in the following way. First we
introduce the notion of the quasi-job-utilisation rate q with 0<=q<=1). When q=1, the skills
allocated to low-level jobs and high-level jobs are exactly sufficient to generate the labour
efficiency units in those jobs as implied by the composition and level of labour demand by job.
At the same time, consistency between ex ante and ex post considerations would require a
particular allocation of a skill to a certain job to be the one which follows from the ex ante cost-
considerations, unless supply constraints for the skill in question prove to be binding. Hence, the
assignment of skills to jobs at any moment in time can be seen as the implementation of the first
parts of the various allocation sequences associated with the different jobs under consideration,
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15) Note that because the linear programming problem is essentially a static optimisation problem, the
intertemporal effects of particular allocations are not taken into account (like, for instance, the fact that
the inexperienced workers of today are the experienced workers of tomorrow). In the case of intertemporal
optimisation under uncertainty regarding the level of demand for output, other interesting aspects of
asymmetries in learning costs and substitution possibilities by skill become more relevant. In particular,
one can envisage a situation where a bias would be expected in the demand for skills towards the ones
which could be used in as many jobs as possible at intertemporal costs which are as low as possible
(including expected matching costs). This provides an intertemporal cost minimisation interpretation to
the notion of a 'flexible' worker.
16) V therefore represents the operating cost of the worst case allocation sequence.
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(2.8)
within the constraints set by the supply of the various skills involved.15
Let J*  denote the optimum job-levels H*, L* where k denotes a job-level), i.e. the number ofk
people with a corresponding skill-level needed to fill the job. Let P  denote the wage-costij,k
(including the corresponding training cost for inexperienced workers) associated with a non-zero
value of first- and/or second best allocation sequences starting with the employment of skill j and
experience type i on type k jobs. V denotes the total labour costs associated with the allocation
sequence which results in maximum costs.  Then, the following linear programming problem16
can be defined:
where S  denotes the total supply of skill j at time t, S  is the total supply of skill j withj j,ki
experience type i with respect to job k. e'  is the relative efficiency of skill-level i on job-leveli,j
j. Note that e' =0 for skill-levels j less than the job-level k, and e' =1 for all j, by definition.j,k j,j
The first constraints are the job demand constraints. The employment of available skills should
generate the required efficiency units of labour in each job. The second set of constraints is the
set of skill supply constraints. These constraints state that the total use of experienced workers
can not exceed the available supply. The third set of constraints states that the total use of skills
may not exceed total supply including both experienced and inexperienced workers. The last
constraint in combination with the first, requires employment to be not larger than needed. From
(2.8) it follows that maximisation of F requires both q to be equal to 1 and a cost-minimising
allocation sequence to be chosen, as it should.
Given the solution to this LP-problem, total employment by skill can now readily be obtained by
aggregating over all experience categories and all jobs. The only things which need to be defined
are the expected present value  of the costs of the relevant allocation sequences per unit of the

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skill which is the first one in each sequence, i.e. the P 's.ij,k
The Valuation of Alternative Allocation Sequences
In valueing a certain allocation sequence, we assume that entrepreneurs do not expect to face
supply constraints in the future, unless they are faced with supply constraints in the present. But
even if the latter is the case, they are assumed to act as if these supply constraints would remain
binding for years only. Non-binding supply constraints are assumed to remain non-binding
forever, until proven wrong. Furthermore, future matches/switches, as opposed to present
matches, are assumed to involve inexperienced workers in all cases.
Given expectations regarding the growth rate of relative wages by skill, the optimum switching
moment t* for each possible allocation sequence starting with a certain skill can be calculated.
If t* proves to be positive, then the allocation sequence in question may prove to be first-best.
If not, then the allocation sequence must be second best, because switching to the second part of
the allocation sequence at time zero i.e. starting out with the second part of the allocation
sequence, as indicated by t*<=0, would lead to a lower expected present value of the costs of the
allocation sequence under consideration. Note, however, that this second-best allocation
sequence would only be chosen when supply constraints would force entrepreneurs to actually
do so. Hence, in this particular case, entrepreneurs expect to stay at least years with this
particular skill-job combination, after which they could decide to return to the unconstrained
optimum allocation sequence, if that would prove to be worthwhile, or they could decide to stick
with the 'forced' allocation instead. The latter could actually prove to be the most profitable thing
to do, since 'returning' to the unconstrained allocation sequence entails the 'sinking' of matching
costs in the future. We now assume that the cost to be assigned to the first part of the allocation
sequence is equal to the minimum of these two options, i.e. 'sticking' and 'returning'.
When we would evaluate the expected present value of the costs of a certain allocation sequence
starting out with an experienced worker, then the corresponding costs of the same allocation
sequence starting out with an inexperienced worker can simply be obtained by adding matching
costs to the cost of an experienced worker. Hence, all possible matches can be defined knowing
the expected present value of allocating an experienced worker to a certain job, as part of a
certain allocation sequence. These present value costs of the various allocation sequences are
described in more detail in MASTER (1997).
Asymmetries in Matching Behaviour 
One of the problems associated with the linear programming approach taken here is that small
changes in relative wages could bring about large changes in the optimum composition of
employment. The introduction of a distinction between experienced workers and  inexperienced
ones ‘causes’ entrepreneurs to have a tendency to stick to a certain allocation once it has been
made in the past for whatever reason (either because it was an optimum allocation in the first
place, or a second best allocation due to supply shortages), because learning costs will be sunk
in the process. However, it is still possible that large changes in the skill composition of
employment occur when wage differentials more than offset learning costs. 
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In order therefore to smooth this transition between different skill compositions of employment,
we assume, just like van Zon and Muysken (1996) have done, that entrepreneurs differ with
respect to the value of their switching thresholds (perceived switching/matching/learning costs
in this case). In fact, we assume that the population of entrepreneurs can be subdivided into 'fast-
switchers' (characterised by relatively low perceived adjustment costs) and 'slow switchers'. The
relative class-sizes depend on relative wages, expected growth rates, etcetera (for more details
see MASTER (1997)). Because entrepreneurs are by assumption distributed over those classes,
aggregate employment must be obtained by aggregation over the corner-solutions belonging to
each of the three classes of entrepreneurs, using the number of entrepreneurs in each class as
weights. While this approach avoids bang-bang behaviour, the valuation of the present value of
the costs associated with the relevant allocation sequences for each class becomes much more
intricate. For a detailed description see MASTER (1997).
 3 The Estimation of the Model
Introduction
In this section we present the estimation results for the model described in the previous section.
Because of the relatively limited amount of data we had at our disposal, it proved to be necessary
to simplify the overall substitution structure of the model to some extent : we specified the job-
isoquant to be given by a Leontief structure, while leaving the rest of the model in tact. This
implies that, measured in efficiency units, the job-composition of employment has been assumed
to be more or less fixed, with the exception of the influence of exogenous trend terms. 
It should be stressed here that the results used here are for illustrative purposes only, because
more work is needed to extend the data-base in order to create the degrees of freedom necessary
for sound empirical estimation of the parameters of the model. Despite the obvious shortcomings
in this respect of both the data our empirical work so far, the results are interesting enough by
itself to present them.  
Data and Classification Issues
The data we have had at our disposal are from Eurostat. However, they cover only very few
years. In fact, for Germany we have available employment and unemployment data for the years
1988-1991, while data for the Netherlands are available for a longer period, i.e. 1979-1989, due
to additional data from the labour force surveys of the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.
An extensive overview of the data and the preliminary calculations we have performed on them
is presented in MASTER (1997).
The employment data are available at a sectoral level for seven sectors with indices A, B, E, F,
M, N and T, respectively: A being the advanced sector, B the building and construction sector,
E the energy sector, F the financial and other services sector, M the material services sector, N
the non-market sector and T the traditional industries sector. For each worker we know the type
of job she or he is working, with indices A, P and T, respectively: A stands for
administrative/commercial job, P stands for personal services and T represents technical jobs.
Finally we also know the level of skill of each worker, where we distinguish three skill levels:
low, medium and high. 
17) Although the approach we have taken here is consistent with the neo-classical idea that wages reflect the
marginal productivity of workers and that the marginal productivity of a worker is higher, ceteris paribus,
the higher his skill-level is, one could also consider situations where high-skilled workers on low-level jobs
are paid lower wages than the same workers on high-level jobs. 
18) A certain match between skills and jobs, and especially the employment of high skills on low jobs, depends
explicitly on the willingness of the persons under consideration to be employed on those jobs. See also
Heijke and Borghans (1996) and Robinson (1997).
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As regards the wage data, these are only available by sector and by skill-level. This is
unfortunate, because it excludes the possibility to specify an alternative to the present model in
which wages are paid in accordance with the job-level of the match under consideration rather
than with the skill-level.  Although one might regard this as a shortcoming of the model, one17
should consider that a change in perspective towards wages being paid by job-level rather than
by skill-level necessarily refocuses the explanation of the skill-composition of employment on
the supply of skills rather than the demand for skills.  This is, however, not the  approach taken18
in most macro-economic models, and it is also not the approach taken in the present paper. 
Classification Issues
The analysis presented above, can easily be extended to more than two job-levels/job-types and
skill-levels. Indeed, in the empirical implementation of the model for Germany and the
Netherlands, we have actually distinguished between three job-levels (high, medium and low)
as well as three different skill-levels (also high, medium and low) - with indices H, M and L
respectively. The naming of the job- and skill-levels suggests a one-to-one correspondence which
is not supported by the data, i.e. one would expect jobs of a certain level to be filled
predominantly by skills of the same level, while employment of skills with levels lower than the
job-level would have to be ruled out on the basis of our a priori notions about substitution
asymmetries. Again, this a priori notion is not supported by the data.
There are several reasons why such a one-to-one correspondence might be lacking. First of all,
the educational classification covers only the level of education attained during normal schooling
years: any additional learning/schooling is ruled out. This would provide a direct explanation of
the possibility to observe matches between skills and jobs, where skill-levels apparently fall short
of job-levels. Secondly, if both the job-classification and the skill-classification are obtained by
aggregation over more detailed classifications which do have a one-to-one correspondence, the
correspondence between skill-levels and job-levels may be broken when the classes over which
job-levels and skill-levels are aggregated are not the same. Since we have only fairly aggregated
data at our disposal in the first, we should not really expect to find a one-to-one correspondence.
However, the unfortunate consequence is that the data we have at our disposal is not consistent
with the model we have presented above. 
In order  to resolve this issue, we assume that when a person with a low skill-level is observed
to be working in a job with a higher level, a wrong classification has been made. Hence,  that
person should be reclassified. The problem is that we do not know whether a mis-classification
is due to an error at the job-side of the classification or at the skill-side. For the reclassification
of the mis-classified person we assume that both errors are present in proportion with the relative
19) In order to clarify the reclassification procedure, let f  represent the two-dimensional frequencyj,s
distribution of skills over jobs, where j represents the job-level and s the skill-level. If f >0 for some s<jj,s
(where increases in s and j correspond with increases in skill- and job-levels), then a new frequency
distribution f  is obtained by distributing the value f  over the adjoining elements f  and f , ini i i ij,s j,s j-1,s j,s+1
proportion with the values of these elements. i denotes a stage in the distribution process. The process
continues until all 'wrong' elements have disappeared. With respect to the employment of high-skilled
workers on low-level jobs, we assume that the observation is due to a mismeasurement of the job-level.
Consequently, we reclassify this entry as high-skilled workers on a medium level job.
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frequencies of the adjoining classes in the job-skill classification.  This reclassification19
introduces a discrepancy between the 'official' data and the data which is consistent with the
model — which is an unfortunate situation. However, by assuming that the number of people
who are wrongly classified from the perspective of the model are a more or less constant fraction
of the 'new' elements in the modified classification, we can 'deconstruct' the outcomes of our
model by applying the reclassification procedure to the model outcomes in reverse. In the absense
of more detailed information regarding effective skill-levels, this is obviously a second best
solution to the problem of how to handle data inconsistencies, but a comparison of our results
with the observed data remains possible in principle.
In addition to these manipulations and reclassifications, we have smoothed the employment
figures and unemployment figures obtained in this way, because the changes over time in the
distribution of the employment figures are fairly irregular. In fact, we have obtained the shares
of employment and unemployment by skill-level and skill-type by means of a two-year moving
average for the years from and including 1989. In order to obtain employment figures by skill-
level, skill-type and job-level and job-type, we have retrapolated the distributions of employment
and unemployment from their 1988 values in the case of Germany. In case of the Netherlands,
we have obtained figures for the years which are not covered by the CBS 'Enquete
beroepsbevolking' data by means of straightforward linear interpolations of the distributions of
employment and unemployment in both skill and job dimensions in the years adjoining the gaps
in the data.
Estimation Results
Because of the linear programming nature of the matching process, it is not possible to use
standard methods to estimates the various relative efficiency parameters and switching cost
parameters from the data described above. Instead, we use a genetic estimation procedure which
is based on Goldberg (1989). This genetic search algorithm encompasses the linear programming
problem which was described in section 2, and combines both data with respect to job-demand
measured in (quasi–) efficiency units and sectoral supply constraints. The objective of this search
algorithm is to find a parameter vector that minimizes an objective function. This objective
function is defined as the sum of the squared residuals between generated optimum employment
and observed employment by skill/job-type match. We also add a penalty to this sum when the
calculated quasi-rate of labour utilisation falls below 1. The procedure is described in detail in
MASTER (1997).
 
20) A word of warning is necessary here, since the administrative job-type does not have any positive
employment entries in the low-level administrative jobs, both for Germany and the Netherlands. This
means that the job-demand constraint in combination with a positive present value price of an allocation
to such a low-level administrative job, forces the estimated employment entries to be equal to zero for any
value of relative efficiencies and relative wages. Consequently, one should disregard the results obtained
for low-skilled administrative jobs.
21) As one may recall, we assume entrepreneurs to be uniformly distributed over these learning costs
parameters between  a zero lower bound and the estimated upperbounds presented here.
22) The exception is T-jobs in the A and B sectors for Germany and in the E and F sectors for the Netherlands.
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Estimation Results for Germany and the Netherlands 
For both Germany and the Netherlands the estimated relative efficiencies are relatively close to
1.25 as is shown in Figure 4. A notable exception is the relative efficiency of medium skilled
workers in low-level jobs for the German E-sector, which appears to be about 1.6 for all three
job types. This reflects the exceptionally high relative wages for medium-skilled workers vis a
vis low-skilled workers in the E-sector (also roughly 1.6). For the Netherlands, the relative
efficiency of high-skilled workers in medium-level jobs is relative high for all three job types in
the M-sector whereas the relative efficiency of the high-skilled workers in medium-level jobs is
very low for the personal jobs in the T-sector. Moreover, the relative efficiencies are more equal
for Germany than for the Netherlands. In general, however, the relative efficiencies are roughly
equal to relative wage rates - both for high skills relative to medium skills and medium skills
relative to low skills. Because we have transformed job-demand measured in man-years into job-
demand measured in efficiency units by using relative wages by skill as a relative efficiency
indicator, this is what one could more or less expect. However, the class sizes of different
switching classes depend on relative wages and efficiencies too. Hence there are other influences
of relative wages on the estimation results beside the ones through the job-demand constraint and
the valuation of the present value of the costs of the various allocation sequences. 
Another remarkable result is that the learning costs as a fraction of the wage costs by skill are
very different for different sectors and different job types.  The estimated upper bounds  on20 21
these learning cost parameters are presented in Figure 5 for both countries.  One can roughly
conclude that there is a tendency for learning costs to be relatively low for low-skilled  workers
for all sectors in the P jobs, and for most T jobs.  This indicates that apparently, given changes22
in relative wage rates, supply conditions and so on, the skills needed to perform satisfactorily on
low-level technical jobs in the German advanced sector A and the building and construction
sector B and in the Dutch Energy sector E and Financial services sector F are more difficult to
acquire than the skills necessary for low-level technical jobs in other sectors. For the other sectors
one can roughly conclude that as far as technical jobs are concerned, the costs of acquiring the
skills necessary for medium-level jobs are often more outspoken than the costs of acquiring the
skills necessary for low-level jobs and for high-level jobs. Although this may seem to be hard to
understand at first, it may indicate that especially the medium-level jobs determine the sector
specificity of the jobs in question, where low-level jobs only need 'eye hand coordination' in the
words of Romer (1990), while high-level jobs require the execution of functions which are less
sector specific, like management, computer engineering, and so on. This conclusion also holds
for administrative jobs, with the exception of the M and N sector, for medium-level and high-
23) Note that in the case of administrative jobs, we may disregard the estimates for low-level jobs. See also
the previous note.
-18-
level administrative jobs. 23
As regards the asymmetries in learning costs for higher-skilled persons on job-levels below their
skill-levels, there is again a fairly wide dispersion in the results. This can be seen from the results
for the parameter phi, which represents the fraction by which the learning costs of medium-
skilled workers on medium-level jobs should be multiplied to obtain the learning costs of the
medium-skilled workers on low-level jobs. The same fraction is used for high-skilled workers
on medium-level jobs. The results show that for the Netherlands, the learning costs for these
workers are not that different from the learning costs of the medium-skilled workers on medium-
level jobs and high-skilled workers on high-level jobs. For Germany, the results are different
where, for instance, the learning costs of high- and medium-skilled workers on medium- and
low-level jobs are almost zero in the M and N sector.
In general we may conclude that the estimates are roughly as expected. First, the relative
efficiencies seem to be much more reliable than the learning cost parameters. This is only natural,
since we have much more direct information about relative efficiencies (in the form of relative
wages) than for the other parameters. In addition to this, the estimation period is very short, while
at the same time only a limited number of estimation runs has been performed, due to the time-
consuming nature of the estimation process. Nonetheless, the results we have obtained so far,
seem to indicate that learning costs are an important determinant of the matches between skills
and jobs, since a zero value of all learning parameters is included in the permissible range of
variation of the parameters under consideration.
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Figure 4. Parameter estimates of the relative efficiencies.
Germany                                                            The Netherlands
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Figure 5 Parameter estimates of the learning costs ( , ,  and ) 
Germany The Netherlands
24) Note that this increase by 1 percentage point in a  is not matched by an average decrease of 1 percentaget,l
point elsewhere, so that the interpretation of a  as an employment share is actually violated. The 0.01t
increase in a  therefore represents a net increase in the corresponding skill-intensity of labour demand.t,l
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4 Some Simulation Experiments
The model described in section 2 has been used to perform two ex post simulation experiments
for Germany and the Netherlands. These experiments are meant to illustrate the influence of the
chimney-effect on employment and to emphasize some interactions which might be relevant from
a policy point of view. It should be stressed here that these are stand-alone experiments: the
simulation results obtained here do not reflect induced substitution effects between labour and
capital (those between jobs have been ruled out already due to the Leontief structure we have had
to impose). Such effects would obscure the illustration of the working of the chimney effect,
which is the subject of this paper. Nonetheless, it should be stressed here that those induced
substitution effects may alter the results, depending on the nature of the experiment. Where
relevant, we will indicate how the results would be influenced by those induced susbtitution
effects. So in the simulation experiments the total demand of labour in terms of efficiencies is
given.
The first experiments we have performed are concerned with the creation of low-, medium- and
high-level jobs for all job-types we have distinguished. As one will recall from section 2, we have
specified a Leontief job-demand structure, measured in efficiency units, where the shares of the
job-types in total employment are constant (apart from an exogenous linear trend term) and
where the shares of job-levels in  the various job-types are constant too (again apart from a linear
trend-term). This means that the job demand J  can be written as: J = a .b .E, where thet,l t,l t,l t
subscript t denotes the job type, and l denotes the job level. a  denotes the share of job-type t andt,l
level l in total jobs of type t, while b  denotes the share of all jobs of type t in total job demandt
E, all measured in efficiency units. Note that we have dropped the sectoral dimension here for
ease of exposition. The experiment we have conducted pertains to an increase in a  by 0.01, fort,l
each of the different job levels.  The first experiment is concerned with an increase in all low-24
level jobs, the second with all high-level jobs and the third with all medium level jobs. Note that
the replacement of a  by a +0.01 increases J  by the same absolute amount in all cases, i.e. byt,l t,l t,l
0.01*b .E. Hence, if the additional jobs would be manned by people with the same skill-level ast
the job-level under consideration, employment of a particular type would increase by the same
number of people. Obviously, the latter does not have to be the case, since higher skilled people
may take the jobs of lower skilled people, depending on the situation on the various (skill-)
labour markets. With regard to induced substitution effects, it should be noted that this
experiment increases, ceteris paribus, effective labour costs per unit of output. Consequently, a
decrease in the labour/capital ratio would be expected, thus decreasing the original expansion of
jobs somewhat. This would still leave an absolute increase in the number of jobs which had
expanded in the first place, but it would also lead to an absolute decrease in the demand for other
jobs.
A second experiment is concerned with a reduction in the wage costs of low-skilled workers, by
means of a 15 percent subsidy on wage costs. While this may seem to be a large amount, this will
only lead to modest changes in the total wage sum by sector of industry and hence to modest
induced substitution effects between labour and capital. This is due to the fact that the share of
25) Thare are a few exceptions to this rule, however. For example, the drop in low-skilled employment in 1982
as shown in Figure 8c is due to a relatively bad performance of the model in those years. This drop is not
in the data themselves. But because the employment share of low-skilled workers is so low, such a drop
can be compensated within the model by only a relatively minor increase in employment of medium-skilled
workers, which is indeed what happens.
26) It should be stressed here that our conclusion may be exaggerated because of the transformations on the
data we have had to perform in order to make them compatible with our model.
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Figure 6 Unemployment Change due to an
increase in low-level jobs
Figure 7 Unemployment Change due to an
increase in high-level jobs
the low-skilled in total employment is fairly low, as opposed to their share in unemployment.
Simulation Results for Germany
The results of the experiment in which we have increased the number of low-skilled jobs as
described above, are summarised in Figures 6 and 8. This can be compared to the results when
we increase the number of all high-level jobs instead - cf. Figures 7 and 9. In all Figures a
reference run is presented too. This is the dotted line: it shows the outcome of the model when
the estimated parameter values are used. As is discussed in MASTER (1997), the reference run
generally shows a very close fit to the observed data.  From Figure 6 we see that, due to the25
increase in low-level jobs, the rate of unemployment falls by about 0.7 percentage points.
However, in the case of an increase in the number of high-level jobs, the drop in the overall rate
of unemployment is of the order of 1 percent, as can be seen from Figure 7. 
The reason for this asymmetry in the results can be understood when the underlying changes in
employment are studied in more detail. The increase in the number of low-level jobs does not
affect employment of high-skilled workers (see Figure 8a), while employment of both low-skilled
workers and medium-skilled workers are positively affected. In fact, the increase in employment
for medium-skilled workers is much larger than for low-skilled workers. This points to two
things. First of all, there are many more medium-skilled workers occupying a low-level job than
there are low-skilled workers doing that. Secondly, although low-level jobs are created in this
experiment, this is primarily beneficial for medium-skilled workers.26
27) Note that this implies that we essentially have a low-skilled employment creation multiplier which is
associated with the creation of one high-level job with a maximum value of about 1.55 which would be
realised when this high-level job is filled by a high-skilled worker previously occupying a medium-level
job, which then is taken by a medium-skilled worker who previously occupied a low-level job.
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When we increase the number of high-level jobs we see that, contrary to the previous experiment,
employment of high-skilled workers is now positively affected, although still fairly little (Figure
9a). Moreover, the increase in employment of the low-skilled is far higher than the corresponding
increase in employment of the high-skilled (Figure 9c), especially in the beginning of the
experimental period. A similar change occurs to employment of medium-skilled workers - cf.
Figure 9b. The conclusion is that we see here an example of the chimney effect at work. Total
employment of high-skilled workers can not change much, because unemployment of high-
skilled workers is relatively low already. Hence, the additional high-level jobs need to be filled
using high-skilled workers previously employed on medium-level jobs. The vacant medium-level
jobs in turn are filled using medium-skilled workers, who need to be drawn in part from the pool
of unemployed, but also from low-level jobs. Hence, here we see an example of the creation of
high-level jobs having a beneficial effect on low-skilled employment. However, medium-skilled
workers profit most. This is only natural, since these are the ones who are first in line to fill the
employment gaps left by high-skilled workers moving into high-level jobs, while the low-skilled
workers are only second in line if there are suplly shortages of medium-skilled workers.
We do not present the outcomes of the experiment in which we increased the number of medium
level jobs. In MASTER (1997) we explain that this raises both the employment of low-skilled
and of the medium-skilled workers, because the pool of unemployed medium-skilled workers
is not enough by itself to supply the extra amount of labour needed to fill the additional medium-
level jobs. And although high-skilled workers could be used to fill medium-level jobs, this does
not happen, because high-skilled workers are already in relatively short supply.
Figures 10 and 11 contain the results of a 15 percent subsidy on wage costs for all low-skilled
workers. Since total employment measured in efficiency units is fixed by assumption (because
of the stand-alone character of the experiments), this means that we should expect low-skilled
workers to be hired for low-level jobs more frequently than before. However, they would replace
medium-skilled workers who were employed in low-level jobs, hence the net effect on total
employment should be of very limited size. But even though employment in efficiency units is
fixed a priori, this is not necessarily the case with employment measured in physical units,
because one medium-skilled worker can replace roughly 1.25 low-skilled workers, while one
high-skilled worker replaces about 1.25 medium-skilled workers, as shown by the estimates of
the relative efficiencies in section 3.  This implies that a reshuffling of employment for a given27
job-type, can still have net positive effects, even though employment in efficiency units is
constant. This is actually what is shown in Figure 10, which shows a drop in the aggregate rate
of unemployment due to the subsidy. The subsidy favours the employment of low-skilled workers
on low-level jobs, which makes the previously employed medium-skilled workers more or less
redundant. They enter the labour market, and some of them succeed in driving out the high-
skilled workers which took up medium-level jobs, due to the existence of previously binding
constraints with respect to the supply of medium-skilled workers. We see then that a subsidy on
the employment of low-skilled workers does indeed lead to positive employment effects at the
aggregate level, although medium-skilled employment and even high-skilled employment fall.
-24-
Figure 8a High-skilled employment Figure 9a High-skilled employment
Figure 9b Medium-skilled employmentFigure 8b Medium-skilled employment
Figure 8c Low-skilled employment Figure 9c Low-skilled employment
Figure 8 An increase in low-level jobs Figure 9 An increase in high-level jobs
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Figure 10 Unemployment change due to a
decrease in low-skilled wage costs
Figure 11a Employment of high-skilled workers
Figure 11b Employment of medium-skilled
workers
Figure 11c Employment of low-skilled workers
Results for the Netherlands
For the Netherlands we have performed the same experiments as for Germany. We will not
present them in detail, but refer to MASTER (1997) instead.  The results are very similar as far
as the ones for the increase in low-skilled jobs are concerned. But the results for the increase in
high-skilled jobs are very different, because the rate of unemployment rises at first, which may
seem to be somewhat odd. The reason is that an increase in the high-level job intensity of labour
demand for a given supply of high-skilled workers may actually lead to a quantitative shortage
of the supply of high-skilled workers, which, by assumption, are the only ones which can take
those high-level jobs. Since high-skilled workers were already in short supply, the supply
constraints become even so binding that total demand for high-level jobs can not be filled for the
given sectoral distribution of high-skilled workers. Consequently, due to the Leontief character
of the job structure of employment, the demand for low- and medium-level jobs is negatively
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affected too (there is no use in hiring low- and medium-skilled workers, when the functions
which high-skilled workers should perform can not be executed because of a quantitative
shortage of the supply of high-skilled workers). Only when job-to-job movements help to
alleviate these quantitative supply shortages, the aggregate rate of unemployment drops below
the base-run value.
In the experiment with a 15 percent subsidy on low-skilled wage costs, we see a very minor net
positive effect on unemployment. This indicates that supply constraints on medium-skilled
workers are more binding in the Netherlands than in Germany, i.e. even though the relative
efficiency estimates are of the same order of magnitude in both Germany and the Netherlands,
the substitution effects ex post are more limited due to the existence of supply constraints.
5 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a model of the allocation of labour of three different skill-levels
(low, medium and high) to jobs which require certain minimum skill-levels (also low, medium
and high). This means that low-skilled people can not perform in medium- and high- level jobs,
while medium-skilled people can take both medium-level and low-level jobs. High-skilled people
could perform well in medium- and high-level jobs. We furthermore assumed that people with
a certain skill-level may perform more efficiently on certain jobs than people with a skill-level
which exactly matches the job-level. This means that from a demand point of view a match
between skills and jobs depends on relative wage-costs by skill. Consequently, mismatches refer
to non-costminimising matches between job- and skill-levels rather than to direct differences
between job-levels and the skill-levels of the people associated with those jobs. Additional
asymmetries between skills are introduced with respect to learning abilities, which favour the
employment of groups with relatively low learning costs. These asymmetries between skills are
important, because it stresses the fact that a match on the labour market will only take place when
the person in question has the ability to (learn to) perform satisfactorily in a certain job.
Consequently, reductions in wage costs only increase the relative demand for certain skills for
certain jobs if the skills in question are suited for those jobs: reductions in wage costs alone are
not sufficient to further employment of certain skill groups. 
Apart from the demand for skills which follows from the job-compostition of labour demand, we
have integrated the supply of skills in a linear programming framework. Thus we are able to
show how the creation of high-level jobs can improve the employment prospects of  low-skilled
people by reducing the displacement of low-skilled people by medium-skilled people on low-
level jobs. The mechanism present in the model sees to it that the increase in the demand for
high-skilled people caused by an increase in high-level job demand (due to our assumptions
regarding allocation asymmetries, high-skilled workers are the only ones who can take on high-
level jobs)  shifts high-skilled workers out of medium-level jobs, medium-skilled workers into
medium-level jobs and out of low-level jobs, while low-skilled workers can move into the job-
positions freed by medium-skilled workers. We have seen this mechanism at work in a number
of experiments we have conducted for Germany and the Netherlands.
In the experiments for Germany in particular we have seen the chimney effect at work. We saw
that the creation of high-level jobs may lead to the employment of medium-skilled workers and
low-skilled workers in job-openings which arise due to job-to-job movements of high-skilled
workers from medium-level jobs to high-level jobs. We also saw that a subsidy on low-skilled
wages, even when labour demand in efficiency units was constant, may actually raise the level
28) Note that the ensuing increase in high-skilled wages would lead to substitution of capital for labour and
to substitution of medium-skilled workers for high-skilled workers on medium-level jobs. This would
mitigate the pressures of excess demand for high-skilled workers to some extent, thus reducing the
negative impact of excess demand for high-skilled workers on the development of overall employment.
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of total employment, due to the fact that medium-skilled workers are driven out of low-level jobs,
where those workers took the place of 1.25 low-skilled workers on average. This implies that the
full employment multiplier associated with the creation of a high-level job may be as high as
1.55, i.e. 1.55 people may find work due to the creation of one high-level job. By contrast, the
creation of 1 additional low-level job will lead to additional employment of at most 1 worker.
In the experiments for the Netherlands we saw that the creation of high-level jobs may actually
cause the occurrence of unemployment for medium- and low-skilled workers instead of
generating positive employment effects as it did in the case of Germany. The reason is that the
logic of the model allows supply constraints of high-skilled workers to become that binding, that
total job demand can not be fulfilled within the limits set by the supply constraints, and, given
the Leontief structure of job demand which we have postulated, the demand for medium- and
low-level jobs is negatively affected too. This stresses the point that the creation of high-level
jobs is not a panacea for low-skilled unemployment problems. Rather, its effectiveness in this
respect depends on high-skilled workers being in relatively high demand, but not too high at the
same time, so as to avoid the negative impact on overall job-demand of an ‘absolute’ excess
demand for high-skilled workers.28
In general then we conclude that the experiments we have conducted with the model underline
the relevance of both the chimney effect and the trickle down effect, as well as the importance
of displacement in determining overall employment opportunities for the various skills under
consideration. The experiments also show how asymmetries in substitution possibilities may
actually lead to job creation multiplication effects which, however, depend very much on the
existence of qualitative binding supply constraints in the higher skill echelons and the
simultaneous absence of binding quantitative supply constraints in these same echelons.
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